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Abstract: To date, Indonesia has been facing the seventh ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) lawsuit 
case in ICSID, the most number of ICSID cases a particular country has in ASEAN. In the meantime, Indonesia 
had to initiate reform in its minerals mining sector policy since the sector had provided little benefit in 
Indonesian sustainable economic development thus far–a policy reform which is potentially highly exposed 
to ISDS lawsuit case. Yet, the reform once issued has no turning back and thus it should move forward. 
Indonesian reform policy to support more its mining downstream by Minerba Act issuance is intended to 
benefit from its scarce, limited non-renewable minerals so as to support national development and maintain 
its long-term interest and economic sustainability. Undoubtfully, the policy reform will be beneficial for 
Indonesian economy sustainability and thus it should be protected from any potential ISDS claims in the 
future. This study seeks to address such real, critical current challenges arising from contingent ISDS claims 
towards Indonesia. This study adopts a descriptive analytical method, which combines literature review, 
authors’ shared expertise in this field, and results of interviews and discussions with several other experts in 
relevant fields. This study concludes that in addressing ISDS contingent problems threatening Indonesian 
current reform policy in mining downstream sector, Indonesia should focus the emphasis on the prevention 
endeavor, those are a review of BITs and IIAs containing ISDS provisions; improvement in investment dispute 
management; which are mainly supported by continuous bureaucracy reform, capacity building, and better 
coordination.  
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1. Introduction 
 
As one of the emerging countries, Indonesia has turned into an attractive investment destination for foreign 
investors. Domestic and foreign investors keep increasing their investment in line with Indonesian 
government continued efforts to facilitate permits and ensure legal certainty for investment. However, as 
time passes by the Indonesian government encounters a situation –normally found in other countries –in 
which it has to change its policy into a new policy for the purpose of national development. New policies or 
policy reforms - now and then - are found contradictory with bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or 
international investment agreements (IIAs). Sometimes this new policy will inevitably have to intersect with 
previous investment project contracts between the government and foreign investor companies, trigger the 
dispute arising between foreign investors and government. If they cannot find a win-win solution, the threat 
to sue the government to international arbitration tribunal becomes something common to hear from foreign 
investors.  
 
The issuance of Law No. 4 of 2009 on Minerals and Coal (Minerba Act) has become a new policy milestone of 
Indonesia in promoting mining downstream sectors. (Ika, 2017) mentions four urgencies of promoting 
mineral downstream policy, i.e. to encourage the establishment of domestic smelters, to integrate upstream-
downstream-industrial operations, to increase mineral added value, and to boost state revenues. On the other 
hand, this policy has the potential to trigger new investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) conflicts with 
foreign mining companies operating in Indonesia under the Contract of Work. In 2014 PT Newmont Nusa 
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Tenggara filed a lawsuit to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) which 
fortunately was withdrawn. Furthermore, PT Freeport International (PTFI), a US copper and gold mining 
company operating in Timika, Irian Jaya, also once threatened to bring the dispute with the Indonesian 
government into international arbitration. Some of PTFI's objections were the clause to change from KK to 
IUPK (Special Mining Permit) and to undertake 51 percent divestment–a rational resistance since divestment 
is an unpopular decision that both damage the reputation and the company image both at home and in the 
host countries (Resmini & Vittucci, 2016). Unfortunately, the Government of Indonesia remained firm with its 
stance. 
 
Recent updates inform that Indonesian government and PTFI have reached an agreement as outlined in the 
Head of Agreement as of July 2018, whereby PTFI approves the above provisions in return for investment 
contracts to be extended until 2041. Another compromise is the Government also guarantees divestment 
obligations and changes in KK status to IUPK will not interfere with the business climate and PTFI long-term 
plan. However, as confirmed by (Losari & Ewing-Chew, 2015), the potential for conflict to arbitration is still 
open since there is still a long way to go between the two parties until implementation is fully implemented. 
The case of disputes in the mining sector between foreign investors and government is not Indonesian 
monopoly. Similar cases also occur in other resource-rich countries such as South Africa (Mohamadieh & 
Uribe, 2016), Equador, Bolivia, and Venezuela (Berger, 2015). If there is no common ground in the case of an 
investment dispute, then the investor brings the case into international arbitration for investor-state 
settlement (ISDS). Those ISDS-related provisions are commonly found in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
and International Investment Agreements (IIAs)3 i.e. Investment Chapters under various Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). Indonesia took part in 64 BITs and five IIAs, i.e. Investment Chapters of FTAs and were 
therefore obliged to the ISDS-related rules under the treaties or chapters. Currently, Indonesia is terminating 
several BITs and reviewing others (Jailani, 2015).  
 
This study has several objectives. The first objective is to briefly describe the history of ISDS scheme existence 
in international treaties, the emergence of ISDS cases including cases that affect Indonesia. Secondly, this 
study will analyze the rationale of policy reform in mining downstream sector which potentially triggers ISDS 
dispute with foreign investors in the mining sector. In the final section, this study will examine the various 
challenges encountered in benefiting the ISDS mechanism and some of the possible solutions that Indonesia 
has to anticipate in ISDS dispute in the mining sector. This study adopts a descriptive analytical method, 
which combines literature review, authors’ shared expertise in this field, and results of interviews and 
discussions with several other experts in relevant fields. Some necessary secondary data is compiled from the 
Ministry of Finance and PTFI. 
 
2. History of ISDS Mechanism  
 
The use of ISDS mechanisms among countries in their investment treaty was initiated in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. Thirty years later the model agreement with the ISDS mechanism has become the standard 
investment treaty. Foreign investors who object with the host country’s policy may file a dispute lawsuit 
against an international arbitration institution. The most popular tribunal for arbitration is the New York-
based International Center for Settlements of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID, which was established in 
1966 and domiciled under the World Bank, currently comprises 162 member countries including Indonesia. 
The ISDS mechanism was seen as a way out at the time for the problems that foreign investors encountered - 
mostly investors came from European and American countries. Some of the investment was in their former 
colonies.  
 
Previously without ISDS, foreign investors had two options to reclaim their investment taken over by the host 
country (UNCTAD, 2014). The first option was to seek justice by filing a lawsuit to a local court or 
administrative court in the country where the investment was located. But this option was often constrained 
by the legal protection of local courts over domestic policies issued by the government. It tended biased 
because local courts saw the government of a sovereign state had privilege and authority over its dosmetic 
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policy as long as it was devoted to national or community interest. Others pointed to the judiciary system in 
developing countries that were sometimes not independent and could be intervened by officials or political 
figures. If this first option failed, there was the second option in which foreign investors might expect 
diplomatic protection assistance from their government. 
  
This second option could be a powerful weapon when the country of origin of the investor belonged to a 
group of ‘’strong’’ countries, in their politics, economy, and defense in the world; even more so if the country 
belonged to a group of superpowers such as the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. Not all 
"strong" countries were willing to intervene in the interest of their investors. It was often that the expectation 
from this second option conflicted with consideration and calculation of greater political interests. Investors 
with large capital were in a more favorable position than small investors, because they had the capital 
strength that was expected to influentially direct their home country foreign policy in defending their 
investment interests. Germany became a pioneer country of the ISDS mechanism, making it prominent as the 
grandfather of investor-state arbitration (Provost & Kennard, 2015). Germany - in the late 1950s - became 
the first country to issue the idea of an obligation of investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms existence 
in investment proposals offered by German investors to developing countries. Germany called the concept of 
its proposed agreement an "international Magna Carta" - an international charter of constitutional rights 
protection for private investors. In the 1960s, the German concept was later adopted by the World Bank 
through the establishment of ICSID. The World Bank decision at the time was not without resistance.  
 
In total 21 World Bank member countries from the developing country group opposed the decision. The 
opposing group believed that the ISDS mechanism would reduce the country’s sovereignty, while the World 
Bank believed that ICSID would be a fair mechanism for investors willing to invest and in return helping 
developing country economies. The foreign investment entry would help the developing country create jobs, 
generate the flow of state revenues in the form of taxes and non-taxes income, and develop the technology. 
Later in the 1980s, German investors became pioneers by initiating to file lawsuits against dozens of 
developing countries such as Ghana, Ukraine and the Philippines to ICSID. Indonesia itself does not escape 
investor claims in ISDS cases. Among ASEAN member countries Indonesia even topped the number of ISDS 
suits filed in ICSID, above the Philippines with three cases. As indicated in Table 1, the Government of 
Indonesia itself has received at least seven lawsuits from foreign investors in the direct disputes between 
foreign investors and Indonesian government (trial at ICSID) and one indirect investment dispute of foreign 
investors and state-owned enterprises owned by the Indonesian government, the so-called Karaha Bodas 
case (trial outside ICSID).  
 
Table 1: Indonesia’s Involvement in Case before ICSID 
No. Case Name Disputed Matter Winning Party Awarded Damages (if 
any) 
1. Amco Asia v. 
Indonesia (1981) 
Lease and management 
agreement and investor’s 
license 
  
 - First Award Investor US$3,200,000 
 - Annulment Government -  
 - Second Award Investor US$2,696,330 
2. Cemex Asia v. 
Indonesia (2004) 
Shares and an option to 
purchase shares in a state-
owned company 
Settled between the parties 
3. East Kalimantan v. 
PT Kaltim Prima 
Coal (2009) 
Divestment requirements in 
the concession contract 
The tribunal declined jurisdiction 
4. Rafat Ali v. 
Indonesia 
(jurisdiction) 
(2011) 
Shares, loans, and financing 
agreements in several 
banks 
The tribunal 
declined 
jurisdiction 
The case is being submitted 
to the ICSID Annulment 
Committee. Claim by Rafat 
Ali was in the amount of 
US$ 75 million. 
5. Churchill Mining v. 
Indonesia (2012) 
Exploration and 
exploitation licences over a 
The tribunal found jurisdiction and the case is 
ongoing. Claim of Churchill Mining is in the 
Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies (ISSN: 2220-6140) 
Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 185-196, August 2018  
188 
 
6. Planet Mining v. 
Indonesia (2014) 
Coal Project Area amount of US$1.05 billion 
7. Nusa Tenggara 
Partnership BV and 
PT Newmont Nusa 
Tenggara v. 
Indonesia (ongoing) 
Regulation on export ban of 
raw materials 
Registered to the ICSID Secretariat on 15 July 
2014. Withdrawn on 25 August 2014. 
Source : Losari & Ewing-Chew (2015) and Magiera (2017), compiled.  
 
3. The Rationale of Indonesian Policy Reform in Minerals and Coals Downstream Sectors 
 
Out of the seven disputes in ICSID involving Indonesia until 2016, only the disputes filed by Churcill Mining 
and Planet Mining that Indonesia won on the dispute subject, while the Hesham Al Waraq and Rafat Ali Rizvi 
(the owners of Bank Century) lawsuit - ended with the refusal by ICSID. As a country with the largest land 
area in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is endowed with rich mineral resources such as nickel, gold, silver, bauxite, 
copper, and tin. But unfortunately, these wealthy resources cannot be managed optimally to boost state 
revenue and the welfare of Indonesian people. The prime cause is that most mining companies operate in the 
upstream and export low-value ore or raw minerals. The practice has lasted for more than 40 years, so that 
Indonesia then gets the nickname as the exporter of a raw material specialist. Then it is realized that 
Indonesia has the potential to change its mineral resources into an economic value that is beneficial to 
national development. Thus, the policy strategy that should be pursued is promoting downstream process or 
value-adding process in the mineral mining sectors. Downstream process or value-adding process by 
Patunru, (2015) is an attempt to curtail raw materials export and instead encourage domestic industries to 
add value to raw materials by producing intermediate or final products while creating jobs at the same time. 
The above reform to promote mining downstream sectors became one of the main policies launched 
during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono second term (2009-2014). Indonesian Government 
reformed its national mineral management policy by issuing Law No. 4 of 2009 on Minerals and Coal 
(Minerba Act).  
 
In addition to the Minerba Act, the government also published a related policy package. The Minerba Act 
was enacted to bring the main mission to encourage the shifting of mineral management from upstream 
to downstream sectors. The shifting is encouraged by requiring Mining Business License (IUP) and 
Contract of Work (KK) holders to build a smelter within the country. The shifting obligation also comes 
with a ban to export raw minerals to mining companies. This prohibition is regulated in the 
implementation of Minerba Act, namely Government Regulation (PP) no. 23 of 2010, and came into 
effect on January 12, 2014 or five years since Minerba Act was enacted. The downstream policy plays an 
important role in the national development as it becomes one of the government fiscal tools to create added 
value in minerals, boost state revenues, promote economic growth, create jobs, and to make Indonesian 
people prosper equitably. The success indicator of downstream mineral policy is Indonesian exported goods 
will be no longer raw materials, yet finished goods which are manufactured from raw materials. Indonesia 
will be able to export lipstick or chemical blend, not palm oil any longer; export aluminium products to 
automotive parts instead of bauxite ore or bauxite concentrate. The economic value added of minerals varies 
depending on their types (Rudenno, 2004). Bauxite ore, for example, its added value increases 12 times or 
reach 25 percent to 35 percent when processed into alumina. Bauxite added value can be increased again up 
to 60 percent, even more through metallurgy process or smelting.  
 
Ni (nickel) content in a ton of laterite ore reaches about 2 percent. With the metallurgy (smelting) process, 
the nickel content in ferronickel can be escalated to 15-30 percent. Another example is copper and gold in 
Papua Island, Indonesia, under PTFI exploration. The content of copper in a ton of ores is only about 0.15-2 
percent, but with smelting process, copper ore content can be escalated to 10-30 times or about 40 percent. 
The gold content (Au) in a ton of laterite ore only ranges from 1.5-4 grams, whereas through a particular 
metallurgy process through purification, it can be increased to 99.99 percent. As a mineral resource-rich 
country, it is an irony that the mining sector in general and mineral mining sector in particular, contributes 
poorly to state revenues and fails to become an economic pillar for Indonesian people welfare. The relatively 
small contribution of Indonesian mineral mining sector is not much different from the contribution of its 
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mining sector in general which only reaches around Rp 60.42 trillion or 6.16 percent of its total state revenue 
(API, 2013). Kementerian ESDM, (2015) reports that the contribution of minerals sector to Indonesia's 
exports and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is only 3.2 percent and 5.12 percent respectively.4  
 
Meanwhile, the contribution of the minerals and coal sector to Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP) only reaches 
4.4 percent (Walker, 2015). Let us compare with Chile - the world's largest copper mineral producer - the 
contribution of the minerals sector to Chile's total exports and GDP has reached 30 percent and 6.7 percent 
respectively (Saggu & Anukoonwattaka, 2015). In fact, Chile is currently exporting concentrate only, not 
higher value-added products as Indonesia expects to acquire through the mineral downstream policy. Thus, if 
the Indonesian reform policy succeeds, Indonesia has potentials to boost its state revenue and increase its 
relative contribution of minerals sector surpassing Chile. Based on the expertise, previous experience, and 
analysis, Ika, (2017) concluded that Indonesian reform policy to promote mineral downstream policy is based 
on four urgencies, i.e. to encourage the establishment of domestic smelters, to integrate upstream-
downstream-industrial operations, to increase mineral added value, and to boost state revenues. First 
urgency, encouraging the establishment of domestic smelters is crucial since the mineral is a non-renewable 
resource base of national wealth. Because of their non-renewable nature, the management of minerals should 
be maximized to generate greater value-added for resource owners.  
 
Failure to maximize the wealth of mineral, such as selling only in the form of ores or concentrates, will result 
in low added value for Indonesia; thus, an obviously big loss to Indonesian people in the long term and 
inheriting nothing but natural destruction to next generations. To prevent it from happening, the Minerba Act 
therefore requires mining companies to construct domestic smelters for processing domestic minerals 
products and prohibits mining companies from exporting ores or raw minerals. The second urgency, the 
integration of industry-downstream-upstream operations needs to be encouraged in order to keep the 
balance of overall mining sectors. Given the current lack of added value in the upstream industry, the mining 
downstream promotion needs to be continuously encouraged in order to contribute greater value added. The 
challenge is in the upstream-downstream operations integration effort, higher risk factors are found in the 
downstream compared to upstream risks (see Burmeister (1988), Harquail, (1991) and Ward & McCarthy, 
(1999). Thus, a special strategy is required. Lessons learned from the efforts of PT. Antam to synergize mining 
business in the upstream (nickel ore) and the downstream (ferronickel) is that such a combined policy is 
proven very vulnerable to be affected by the world nickel price fluctuations.  
 
If the ores price drops in the global market, then two sources of Antam's revenue are both eroded, i.e. the 
revenue from nickel ore sales and the revenue from ferronickel sales. When the price of nickel ore is high, 
Antam greatly benefits from the rising  price of nickel or ferronickel. When the price of nickel ore in the global 
market reached the highest level in 2007, Antam recorded the highest profit in its history, which was around 
Rp5.1 trillion. However, when the price of nickel ore dropped dramatically, the price of ferronickel also 
slumped so that Antam was greatly disadvantaged. After 2007, the price of nickel ore in the international 
market has continued to decline, so Antam's profit also continues to erode to negative reach in 2014 and 
2015 (Antam, 2015). Industry-downstream integration is seen as having a lower risk compared to 
downstream-upstream integration, as the downstream business risks are not directly related to the business 
risks in manufacturing industries. If a stainless steel factory does not get ferronickel supplies from a local 
smelter, this supply can be provided from other smelters or even from abroad as long as it is affordable. The 
good news is PT Smelting Gresik (PTSG) has now integrated industry-downstream activities. PTSG has a 
smelter to process copper concentrate into the copper cathode. PTSG does not operate in the upstream of 
copper, but operates downstream by receiving copper supplies from PTFI and PT Amman to be processed 
into copper cathode.  
 
PTSG then sells copper cathode products to the cable industry and fertilizer industry (Petrokimia Gresik). The 
third urgency is to increase the added value of minerals, because the mineral resources, especially metals will 
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be exhausted and non-renewable. Based on the facts, metal mineral resources need to be processed 
domestically to produce higher added value, which in turn it can accelerate national economic growth. Mine-
producing areas that successfully diversify the economy from each value chain enjoy more success than those 
areas that neglect economic diversification and continuously depend on the mine. These evidences are the 
results of studies conducted by Thomas Michel Power, as quoted by Sembiring, (2009). Power studies 
further find that areas that rely on upstream mining operations tend to experience economic decline and 
depression, especially after the mine has been exhausted or entering the post-mining phase. Another 
study conducted by Stijns, (2001) also asserts that countries that opt to export their natural resources 
rather than utilize them for domestic and manufacturing industries, their economic growth will 
significantly suffer from negative impact. Reflecting on Stijns, (2001), Indonesia still has problems in 
optimizing its mineral resources to boost its manufacturing sector and economic growth. Let us take 
aluminium as an example. Indonesia has substantial aluminium mineral reserves and the state-owned 
enterprise which operate the exploration (PT Inalum), but unfortunately this aluminium wealth cannot 
be utilized and optimized to develop its domestic and manufacturing industry. Different cases are found 
in Australia, where the country has successfully managed its bauxite reserves. Australia has six 
aluminium smelters scattered in several states (New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria), 
managed by big companies Rio Tinto, Alcoa, Pechiney, VAW Aluminium AG and a consortium of Japanese 
companies. The bauxite mineral mixed with other metallic minerals such as chrome, steel, or nickel, will 
produce excellent aluminium (alloy), which is heat resistant, strong but flexible, and easy to form, so it 
can be used for automotive, shipbuilding, and aircraft parts manufacturing industry. With the industry-
downstream-upstream integration as Australia undertakes, the economic value added obtained is much 
greater, and so is the tax contribution to the country.  
 
Following the enactment of Minerba Act, Indonesian reform has progressed. To process mineral ores 
and give more added value to them, so far Indonesia has built 24 operating smelters, consisting of 15 
nickel smelters, four iron smelters, two bauxite smelters, two manganese smelters, and one copper 
smelter. In addition, many other smelters that are currently under construction will follow the 
operation. The fourth urgency of mineral downstream policy is to optimize the mineral sector 
contribution to state revenue, both taxes and non-taxes. The potential for high state revenues from 
mineral resources can only be realized if the government reforms its mineral management policy. The 
current dependence on mining operations in the upstream sector by exporting mineral ores (nickel, 
bauxite, copper and iron) has resulted in low state revenue both in tax and non-tax contribution. 
Therefore it does make sense that Indonesia then requires mining companies to build smelters and ban 
the export of raw minerals as stipulated in the Minerba Act. As an illustration, PTFI's total contribution to 
state revenues (dividends, royalties, as well as taxes and other non-taxes) in 2006 amounted to 1.6 billion US 
dollars, of which 81 percent came from taxes and non-taxes (Table 2). The declining trend in commodity 
prices in global markets occurring since 2012 has impacted PTFI's revenue, which has continued to decline 
and even recorded losses. PTFI cannot pay dividends to its shareholders, including the Indonesian 
government which owns 9.36 percent of PTFI shares. 
 
Table 2: The contribution of PTFI to State Revenues (USD Millions) 
Types 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Dividends for 259 216 49 213 169 202 - - - 
Government 
Royalty 
 
146 
 
164 
 
121 
 
128 
 
185 
 
188 
 
76 
 
101 
 
118 
Taxes and Non-Taxes 1294 1425 1039 1013 1569 1993 904 383 421 
Total 1600 1805 1209 1354 1922 2383 980 484 539 
Source: Kementerian Keuangan. APBN dan Laporan Realisasi APBN (2006-2014), and Freeport McMoRan Inc. 
Annual Report, (2006-2014) compiled. 
 
Another illustration is the PT. Antam, which also suffered from decreasing income due to declining mineral 
prices in the global market. When the nickel price reached its peak in 2007, Antam could earn net profit 
amounted to Rp5.1 trillion and contributed more than Rp2 trillion to state revenues. After 2007, mineral 
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prices in the global market continued to decline so that PT Antam contribution to state revenues dropped to 
only Rp 111 billion in the first half of 2015. All of these are due to PT Antam dependence on the sales of lower 
grade nickel ore which is vulnerable to commodity price volatility in the global market. Antam has recently 
changed its strategy and has shifted its business further to the downstream. Antam currently has five 
operating smelters (three nickel, one alumina and one gold smelters) and is building four other smelters, the 
Pomalaa Ferronickel Expansion Project (P3FP), the Halon Ferronickel Development Project (P3FH), the SGAR 
Mempawah Project and the Project Anode Slime & Precious Metals Refinery. Antam has also built a 
partnership with Inalum for the Smelter Grade Alumina Refinery (SGAR) project in Mampawah, West 
Kalimantan. Antam will also increase its ferronickel production capacity from 18,000-20,000 TNi to 27,000-
30,000 TNi per year through P3FP.  
 
The successful development of Antam entire project will certainly increase its contribution significantly to 
state revenues. Referring to all the explanation above, it is obvious that Indonesia has adopted a strategic 
national policy in its mining sectors by issuing the Minerba Act, and deliberately initiated to support its 
mining downstream sectors. Undoubtfully, the policy reform will be beneficial for Indonesian economy 
sustainability and thus it should be protected from any potential ISDS claims in the future. As shown in Table 
1 in the previous section, six of seven ISDS cases toward Indonesia have taken place in extractive or mining 
sectors, and only Rafat Ali case is related with other sectors. Out of six ISDS cases in extractive or mining 
sectors, three cases took place before Minerba Act came into effect and the other three have happened 
afterwards. The last case – which is still in tribunal process - is specifically related with the implementation 
regulation of the Minerba Act. The issuance of policy reform in Indonesian mineral mining has clearly 
triggered one ISDS case, and it is not unlikely that next ISDS cases opposing this law will occur in the near 
future. Indonesia should anticipate the possibility and it should endeavour to understand thoroughly the 
upcoming challenges and possible solutions to address such challenges. 
 
4. Challenges in Benefiting ISDS Mechanism 
 
Despite the opposition from many developing countries, the World Bank decision to standardize ISDS 
adoption in BITs and IIAs is anyhow based on goodwill from the perspective the institution had at the 
moment. In the absence of common ground, with the existing provision of ISDS schemes, it is hoped that an 
independent, impartial and fair court forum for investors and government will be established, which does not 
carry an unnecessary burden of political issues and is able to focus on disputed legal issues. Investors should 
not be concerned about the existence of partial, unfair local court treatment or the compulsion to influence 
their home countries to provide political intervention through diplomatic channels. On the other hand, the 
small investment destination countries with low bargaining power in international diplomacy also need not 
worry about the political pressure and lobbies of 'strong' home countries, the countries where the investors 
are domiciled.  Currently, ISDS provisions are generally included in the most of international investment 
agreements (including BITs) and free trade agreements. These provisions provide foreign investors with the 
right to activate the ISDS system, if they wish to counter the host country’s decisions that impact on their 
investment.  
 
Those supporting ISDS and the participation in ICSID suggest three arguments: 1) the ISDS mechanism still 
makes the host states accountable under BITs, 2) the provisions in the BITs protect fundamental rights of 
investors and ensure procedural fairness, and 3) the adjudication through the ISDS involve arbitrators who 
are not formally connected to the parties to the dispute. It shows that the ISDS mechanism can contribute to 
the rule of law. However, the looming negative sentiment in European countries and Australian shows 
contrary facts with the spirit of maintaining the existence of the ISDS mechanism. As a matter of fact, the two 
EU pillar countries i.e. France and Germany have shown their concerns about the effect of ISDS provisions 
during the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations between EU and USA. It is 
awkward to see that this time France and Germany (the latter is prominently known as the pioneer country of 
ISDS provisions) wish investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) provisions removed from TTIP agreement 
currently under negotiation (Provost & Kennard, 2015).  
 
Australia in the case of a particular IIA also has shown concerns and wishes similar thing (Setiawan, 2018).  
Those criticizing ISDS show various concerns with the current ISDS practice. The issues vary from financial 
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burden to developing country, corporate profit-seeking from the claim, sovereignty, policy space, uneven 
business playing field, to legislative resistance. In current ISDS practice, developing countries are in the 
disadvantaged party compared to the developed countries. Gallagher & Shrestha, (2011) study shows that in 
the tribunal verdicts on ISDS disputes, developing countries are potentially exposed to higher financial 
charges than developed countries. The average financial charges that developing countries have incurred for 
awarded damages to foreign investors are US$ 99 cents per capita, which is eight times those of developed 
countries that have incurred only US$ 12 cents per capita. International investment treaty arbitration takes 
more time and significantly costs more than resolving similar disputes in domestic courts in the United States 
or in the United Kingdom (Bonnitcha, 2017). Foreign investors currently tend to register a claim benefiting 
ISDS clause more frequently, and IIAs with ISDS are beginning to have serious repercussions for developing 
countries (Knoerich & Berger, 2014).  
 
In many cases, foreign investors’ motives filing their lawsuit to international arbitration are not only to 
recover the invested funds, but also for the alleged loss of profits and the loss of "future earnings 
expectations". On average, one of three cases concluded at ICSID ends with dispute resolution. While the 
rewarded damages value is often not disclosed in detail, the disputes generally result in huge benefits for 
investors. The state must pay after the ISDS arbitration decision that wins foreign investors, otherwise the 
state assets will be the seizure target in almost every country in the world (Provost & Kennard, 2015). 
Knoerich & Berger, (2014) mentions that the provisions in IIAs may potentially override national legislation 
and the decisions of international arbitration may possibly supersede the decision of domestic courts. In this 
context, they regard that the current IIA regime has sometimes appeared to be superior to national law. If not 
taken carefully, ISDS disputes potentially disrupt a country's sovereignty and its right to regulate in its 
territory, as foreign investor pressure may force the government to change the law to please the investor. 
Tobacco companies regularly threaten investment treaty arbitration when governments propose new 
tobacco control measures, although some countries have proceeded with stricter tobacco control measures 
amidst such threats (Berger, 2015).  
 
Jailani, (2015) argues that most provisions of the existing IIAs containing ISDS are outdated as they grant 
extensively broad protections and rights for foreign investors, yet on the other hand leaving little to no policy 
space to the host state in achieving development goals. The current regime of IIAs is viewed not granting 
sufficient space for sustainable development. The situation is an impetus that a general modernization is 
necessary in order to preserve the right of states to exercise their regulations and policy space. He also stated 
that ISDS provisions seem to be problematic and their benefits are far from clear. Uneven playing fields 
between national and foreign corporations also take place, meanwhile the inclusion of ISDS provisions will be 
a highly contentious issue in the ratification process involving legislative. In the context of Indonesia's 
concerns with ISDS provisions, some legal experts (such as Prof. Hikmahanto from University of Indonesia) 
and researchers (such as Ina Primiana from LP3E Kadin) have even accorded extreme advice to the 
Indonesian government to quit the World Bank's ICSID membership, which also means to quit from ISDS 
mechanism.  
 
Reflecting on some of the ISDS cases in Indonesian experience, ISDS mechanism may potentially be used by 
'rogue' and 'naughty investors' who make the case to the international arbitration panel (Birdieni & 
Kiansantang, 2014)–a similar experience also occurred in South Africa case (Provost & Kennard, 2015). The 
release of Indonesia from ICSID will allow Indonesia to be free of any legal challenge filed by investors in the 
forum. Some Latin American countries namely Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have committed the action 
first. The ICSID lawsuit trial will cost some compensation (such as lawyer fee) that is not a small one even if 
Indonesia wins in a case. If Indonesia loses a case, the amount of awarded damages for claimant investors and 
costs that Indonesia incurs will be even more terrible since it reaches millions of USDs. Losari & Ewing-Chow, 
(2015) suggests a different perspective. The authors believe that Indonesia should continue to have ISDS 
mechanisms, either institutional or non-institutional arbitration. The experience of other countries shows 
that the ISDS mechanisms, including ICSID arbitration, may actually contribute to better governance. In 
Mexico, local government tends to comply with domestic and international legal obligations after the local 
regulations trigger investor-state dispute. The concern for arbitration in ISDS has been successful in making 
host states comply with their IIAs obligations in an effective, neutral, and independent forum for the 
settlement of investment disputes (Schill, 2015; Mildner, 2015).  
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Putting out the Fire before It Spreads 
 
In the ICSID forum, Indonesia has been sued by foreign investors in at least seven cases as shown in Table 1. It 
puts Indonesia in the top rank country of the highest number of international arbitration cases in ASEAN, 
above the Philippines in the second place with three cases. Such facts forced the Indonesian government to 
contemplate the right policies to address ISDS problems potentially emerging from foreign investment. 
Considering all the explanations above, the authors view that the emphasis is on addressing ISDS hidden 
problems should be focused in prevention endeavour. Policy options necessary to be taken for ISDS cases 
prevention endeavour are discussed below. Better coordination is necessary among all stakeholders: central 
and regional governments, relevant ministries, especially when a measure may have impacts on foreign 
investors. Information technology should be involved in coordination efforts including in compiling and 
disseminating existing regulations among officials.  
 
A Review of BITs and IIAs Containing ISDS Provisions: Indonesia is currently reviewing comprehensively 
it's 64 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as well as five investment chapters under various free trade 
agreements. The review process involves three steps: discontinuation of existing IIAs, reassessing the 
provision of the existing IIAs and developing a new treaty model of IIA. The first step taken by Indonesia is to 
discontinue its existing IIAs and the revoke process so far has reached 17 out of 64 IIAs. The termination 
takes a gradual approach in order to avoid any unwanted political implications and bilateral backlash that 
might potentially undermine Indonesia’s position. The second step of Indonesia review completely relates to 
the fact that the core gravity of the review is the reassessment of the existing provisions. Every single IIA is 
scrutinized to capture the most potential problems in BITs and IIAs provisions, such as the ‘scope’ and 
‘definition of investment’, the ‘Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment’ principle, ‘National Treatment (NT)’ 
principle, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)’, ‘expropriation’ and ISDS. The goals of reassessment are 
identifying problems and obtaining the most feasible solutions serving as the Government’s new position on 
IIAs, particularly the extent to which those provisions provide protection to the investors and its impact to 
the policy space of the Government. 
 
The third step is developing a Treaty Model. The goal is to provide a guideline for Indonesian officials in 
negotiating and concluding investment treaties. Other countries such as India and South Africa have 
successfully built their own treaty models (Jailani, 2015). Losari & Ewing-Chew, (2015) views that the 
Indonesian government’s BIT review is timely. They argue that there should be a balance between investor 
protection and national sovereignty in the new BITs. Several clauses in Indonesia’s existing BITs need more 
clarity, which can potentially lead to difficulties for tribunals in interpreting the provisions. For illustration, 
the purpose of the agreement should be clearly mentioned in favor of not only for investors but also for 
greater economic cooperation, or extending and intensifying mutual economic relations. Foreign investment 
protection is not the individual goal of the treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of 
encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. A balance 
between investor protection and the state’s policy space with a view to promoting sustainable development 
principles should be upheld and translated into the purpose of the agreement.  
 
 In taking this review, Indonesia needs no worry losing potential foreign investments. There is no evidence 
that foreign investors will pack their bags and leave due to their resistance to host country’s measure of 
review on BITs and IIAs containing ISDS provisions. Several countries – both developed and developing 
countries – have sought to reform their model treaties and either to negotiate more balanced IIAs in future or 
renegotiate existing ones and this policy option has no impact on the country’s attraction to foreign investors 
(Bonnitcha, 2014a) in Berger, (2015). In reviewing BITs and IIAs, Indonesia needs to undertake a critical 
evaluation to comprehend the impact of existing IIAs on the Indonesian national economy. The government 
also needs to formulate a new approach towards IIAs, which will be fine-tuned in favor of its interest in 
pursuing national development goals. In the diplomatic relation area, Indonesia brings economic diplomatic 
mission aiming at creating a new regime for investment agreements between Indonesia and other countries. 
In association with MFN, NT, FET, expropriation, and ISDS, in order to avoid potential dispute with foreign 
investors, several important clauses adopted in existing IIAs are worth to discuss as possible solutions.  
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Indonesia needs to protect itself from any potential dispute with foreign investors from several aspects 
relevant with consistency: inconsistency between central government regulations and local government 
regulations, between the treaty and GATS, and among chapters (Setiawan, 2018). In order to maintain the 
consistency between an investment treaty and national measures or local government measures, Indonesia 
may include such reservations: existing non-conforming measures of all regions of Indonesia” in non-
conforming measures (BITs and IIAs) and future measures (only IIAs). Such reservations can be found in 
some FTA agreements, such as Singapore-US FTA, Japan-Mexico FTA, and Australia-Singapore FTA. It is an 
important issue since under current Indonesia’s laws on decentralisation, local governments have the 
authority to issue business licenses. Meanwhile, business licensing by local governments has been at the heart 
of several of Indonesia’s arbitration cases (Magiera, 2017). The issue of consistency between the investment 
treaty with GATS must also be taken carefully by Indonesia. In GATS there is particularly energy services 
sectors which are possibly related with some issues in extractive sectors, especially oil and gas mining. By 
adopting a similar clause employed in Singapore-US FTA and Canada-Peru FTA, Indonesia may add some 
reservations in the non-conforming measures schedule as follows. Reserves the right to adopt or maintain 
any measure that is not inconsistent with Indonesia’s obligations under Article XVI of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services. The consistency between chapters in an agreement should also be maintained. As an 
illustration, the substance in transfer-related provisions may differ between chapters in IIAs that contain 
chapters such as the Investment Chapter, Trade in Goods Chapter, and Services Chapter. A BOP (Balance of 
Payment) safeguard clause is also at times found only in one of the chapters, whereas this clause should be 
included in the three chapters. Transfer and safeguard BOP clauses are critical to being included in the main 
chapters, given such clauses are crucial for developing countries to protect their economy during the crisis. 
While clauses in the terminated BITs above can be revised during the next negotiations, this is not the case for 
existing investment chapters under Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). Indonesia should wait until the FTAs or EPAs comes into general review phase or are terminated 
consensually. If the scenario takes place, it is recommended that Indonesia includes a clause allowing partial 
termination of a chapter, particularly the investment chapter in the FTAs or EPAs. Other clause needs 
attention is the existence of ‘survival clause’. This clause allows foreign investors, who have had their 
investments made or acquired before the date of termination, to benefit prolonged protection for a certain 
amount of time (usually 10 – 15 years) even after termination of the treaty. 
 
Improvement in Investment Dispute Management: Reflecting the fact that Indonesia topped the country 
with the most ISDS lawsuits among ASEAN member countries, it is crystal clear that Indonesia needs to 
improve its management of investment disputes. In that regard, the development of investor-state conflict 
management, a basis for protocols for dispute avoidance is suggested. These processes are intended to 
provide ways out for the interests of the parties involved in the early stage of the conflict to eliminate or 
reduce the source of dissatisfaction. Another way out associated with procedural limitations can be helpful, 
such as developing a special agreement between the investor and Indonesia if the case should be registered to 
international arbitration. Establishing an investment dispute management unit has been applied to other 
countries such as Korea and Peru. Korea created the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman within the 
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, an office independent and only accountable to the Prime 
Minister. The office facilitates foreign investors who face problems or conflicts in several issues, such as 
taxation, investment procedures and incentives, customs and tariffs, finance, labor, insurance, and visa. In 
Peru, such an office imposes accountability on the agency which has triggered the dispute by incurring any 
costs of the process (Losari & Ewing-Chew, 2015). 
 
Indonesia Needs for Continuous Bureaucracy Reform, Capacity Building, Better Coordination: 
Indonesia bureaucracy reform is still ongoing, yet there are still many weakness identified along the reform 
process. It should be realized that bureaucracy reform is a never-ending  process and this effort should 
always be a priority and continuously supported by every elected national leader. Politicians may change, but 
the bureaucracy reform should never stop. Without robust, efficient, and effective bureaucracy, every 
government program including management of investment disputes and better coordination cannot be 
achieved successfully. Capacity building for Indonesian officials Indonesia should be prioritized. Processes 
should be generated to keep bureaucracy system involving those officials aware of reviewing each proposed 
government’s measure, either in state or local government level, that may affect foreign investors, and its 
compliance with Indonesia’s international obligations under its IIAs, before a particular measure becomes 
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effective. The process should invite public consultation with interested parties, including investors or the 
society who might be impacted. The government then should take the inputs and comments into 
consideration for the measure revision. Potentially arising dispute could be prevented effectively in the 
beginning to assure the investors do not appeal the investment dispute case to international arbitration.    
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
ISDS mechanism adoption in BITs and IIAs was initiated in the late 1960s and the beginning of 1970s. Despite 
21 developing countries opposition, World Bank decided to support the mechanism and provides a specific 
tribunal for ISDS by establishing ICSID in 1966. While in the beginning the investors appeal for ISDS was 
seemingly intended purely to reclaim justice, currently investors in several cases register allegedly frivolous 
claims to international arbitration. Indonesia does not escape the ISDS lawsuit, and even among ASEAN 
member countries Indonesia topped the number of ISDS suits filed in ICSID.   Indonesian reform policy to 
support more its mining downstream by Minerba Act issuance is based on its national interest seeking to 
benefit from its scarce, limited non-renewable minerals so as to support national development and maintain 
its long-term economic sustainability. To realize the vision, thus, more specifically Indonesia needs to 
encourage the establishment of domestic smelters, to integrate upstream-downstream-industrial operations, 
to increase mineral added value, and to boost state revenues. Benefiting from ISDS inclusion in BITs or IIAs 
has some challenges, since there are some pros and cons toward the ISDS inclusion.  
 
Those who support ISDS inclusions believe ISDS mechanism is good to make host states accountable under 
BITs, necessary to protect fundamental rights of investors and ensure procedural fairness, and the 
adjudication involve independent arbitrators. Meanwhile, the parties who oppose believe that ISDS 
mechanism will be harmful to and put unnecessary big or even huge compensation burden to host countries. 
Not only developing host country but also developed host country in Europe and Australia in specific BITs or 
IIAS cases have proposed no ISDS inclusion. ISDS mechanism may potentially override national legislation 
and the decisions of international arbitration may possibly supersede the decision of domestic courts. The 
most frequent ISDS claims which Indonesia has received among ASEAN members surely forced the 
Indonesian government to envisage the right policies to address the problems potentially emerging from 
foreign investment. The authors view that the emphasis on addressing ISDS contingent problems should be 
focused on prevention endeavor. As previously explained in more details and more specifically in the above 
section, authors recommend the prevention endeavor should be undertaken and focused on the review on 
BITs and IIAs containing ISDS provisions; improvement in investment dispute management; and continuous 
bureaucracy reform, capacity building, and better coordination. It is suggested that Indonesia proposes to 
shorten the time period of such a clause, and different survival clause durations for different sectors of 
investment. 
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